



## The research of the Vulnerable Subject: An Unfinished Discussion in Contemporary Spanish Feminisms

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### Abstract

*I would like to use the occasion of this essay to take a broad, sweeping look at second-wave feminism (SWF). Not at this or that current of feminist activism, nor at this or that strand of feminist theorizing. Not at this or that geographical slice of the movement, nor at this or that sociological stratum of women. I want, rather, to try to see SWF whole, as an epochal social phenomenon. Looking back at nearly 40 years of feminist activism, I want to venture an assessment of the movement's overall trajectory and historical significance. In looking back, however, I hope also to help us look forward. By reconstructing the path we have traveled, I hope to shed light on the challenges we face today—in a time of massive economic crisis, social uncertainty, and political realignment. I am going to tell a story, then, about the broad contours and overall meaning of SWF. Equal parts historical narrative and social-theoretical analysis, my story is plotted around three points in time, each of which places SWF in relation to a specific moment in the history of capitalism. The first point refers to the movement's beginnings in the context of what I will call "state-organized capitalism." Here I propose to chart the emergence of SWF from out of the anti-imperialist New Left as a radical challenge to the pervasive androcentrism of state-led capitalist societies in the postwar era. Conceptualizing this phase, I shall identify the movement's fundamental emancipatory promise with its expanded sense of injustice and its structural critique of society. The second point refers to the process of feminism's evolution in the dramatically changed social context of rising neoliberalism. Here,*

*I propose to chart not only the movement's extraordinary successes but also the disturbing convergence of some of its ideals with the demands of an emerging new form of capitalism—postfordist, "disorganized," transnational. Conceptualizing this phase, I shall ask whether SWF has unwittingly supplied a key ingredient of what Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello call "the new spirit of capitalism." The third point refers to a possible reorientation of feminism in the present context of capitalist crisis and US political realignment, which could mark the beginnings of a shift from neoliberalism to a new form of social organization. Here, I propose to examine the prospects for reactivating feminism's emancipatory promise in a world that has been rocked by the twin crises of US hegemony and finance capital and now awaits Barack Obama's assumption of the American presidency.*

**Keywords:** Spanish; feminism, USA, tendencies

In general, then, I propose to situate the trajectory of SWF in relation to the recent history of capitalism. In this way, I hope to help revive the sort of socialist-feminist theorizing that first inspired me decades ago and that still seems to me to offer our best hope for clarifying the prospects for gender justice in the present period. My aim, however, is not to recycle outmoded dual-systems theories, but rather to integrate the best of recent feminist theorizing with the best of recent critical theorizing about capitalism.

To clarify the rationale behind my approach, let me explain my dissatisfaction with what is perhaps the most widely held view of SWF. It is often said that the movement's relative success in transforming culture stands in sharp contrast with its relative failure to transform institutions. This assessment is doubled-edged: on the one hand, feminist ideals of gender equality, so contentious in the preceding decades, now sit squarely in the social mainstream; on the other hand, they

have yet to be realized in practice. Thus, feminist critiques of, for example, sexual harassment, sexual trafficking, and unequal pay, which appeared incendiary not so long ago, are widely espoused today; yet this sea-change at the level of attitudes has by no means eliminated those practices. And so, it is frequently said: second-wave feminism has wrought an epochal cultural revolution, but the vast change in mentalités has not (yet) translated into structural, institutional change.

There is something to be said for this view, which rightly notes the widespread acceptance today of feminist ideas. But the thesis of cultural success-cum-institutional failure does not go very far in illuminating the historical significance and future prospects of second-wave feminism. Positing that institutions have lagged behind culture, as if one could change while the other did not, it suggests that we need only make the former catch up with the latter in order to realize feminist hopes. The effect is to obscure

a more complex, disturbing possibility: that the diffusion of cultural attitudes born out of the second-wave has been part and parcel of another social transformation, unanticipated and unintended by feminist activists—a transformation in the social organization of postwar capitalism. This possibility can be formulated more sharply: the cultural changes jump-started by the second wave, salutary in themselves, have served to legitimate a structural transformation of capitalist society that runs directly counter to feminist visions of a just society.

In this essay, I aim to explore this disturbing possibility. My hypothesis can be stated thus: What was truly new about the second wave was the way it wove together in a critique of androcentric state-organized capitalism what we can understand today as three analytically distinct dimensions of gender justice: economic, cultural, and political. Subjecting state-organized capitalism to wide-ranging, multifaceted scrutiny, in which those three perspectives intermingled freely, feminists generated a critique that was simultaneously ramified and systematic. In the ensuing decades, however, the three dimensions of justice became separated— from one another and from the critique of capitalism. With the fragmentation of the feminist critique came the selective incorporation and partial recuperation of some of its strands. Split off from one another and from the societal critique that had integrated them, second-wave hopes were

conscripted in the service of a project that was deeply at odds with our larger, holistic vision of a just society. In a fine instance of the cunning of history, utopian desires found a second life as feeling currents that legitimated the transition to a new form of capitalism: postfordist, transnational, neoliberal.

In what follows, I propose to elaborate this hypothesis in three steps, which correspond to the three plot points mentioned earlier. In a first step, I shall reconstruct the SWF critique of androcentric state-organized capitalism as integrating concerns we associate today with three perspectives on justice, which I shall call redistribution, recognition, and representation. In a second step, I shall sketch the coming apart of that constellation and the selective enlistment of some of its strands to legitimate neoliberal capitalism. In a third step, I shall weigh the prospects for recovering feminism's emancipatory promise in the present moment of economic crisis and political opening.

### I. Second-Wave Feminism Confronts State-Organized Capitalism:

#### Expanding the Meaning of Justice and Critiquing the Social Totality

Let me begin by situating the emergence of second-wave feminism (SWF) in the context of state-organized capitalism (SOC). SOC is my term for the hegemonic social formation in the postwar era, a social formation in which states played an active role in steering their national economies. We

are most familiar with the form taken by SOC in the welfare states of what was then called the First World, which used Keynesian tools to soften the boom-bust cycles endemic to capitalism. Drawing on experiences of depression and war-time planning, these states implemented various forms of dirigisme, including infrastructural investment and industrial policy, redistributive taxation and social provision, fiscal policy and business regulation, nationalization of some key industries and decommodification of public goods. Certainly, it was the most wealthy and powerful OECD states that were able to “organize” capitalism most successfully in the decades following WWII. But a variant of SOC could also be found in what was then called the Third World. In impoverished postcolonies, newly independent “developmental states” sought to use their more limited capacities to jumpstart national economic development by means of import substitution policies, infrastructural investment, nationalization of key industries, and public spending on education.

In general, then, I use the expression “SOC” to refer to the OECD welfare states and the postcolonial developmental states of the postwar period. It was in these countries, after all, that SWF first erupted in the early 1970s. To explain what exactly provoked the eruption, let me note four defining characteristics of the political culture of SOC.

1) Economism: By definition, as we already saw, SOC involved the use of public political power to regulate (and in some cases, to replace) economic markets. This was largely a matter of crisis management in the interest of capital. Nevertheless, the states in question derived much of their political legitimacy from their claims to promote inclusion, social equality, and cross-class solidarity. Yet these ideals were interpreted in an economistic and class-centric way. In the political culture of SOC, social questions were framed chiefly in distributive terms, as matters concerning the equitable allocation of divisible goods, especially income and jobs, while social divisions were viewed primarily through the prism of class. Thus, the quintessential social injustice was unfair economic distribution, and its paradigm expression was class inequality. The effect of this class-centric, economistic imaginary was to marginalize, if not wholly to obscure, other dimensions, axes, sites, and causes of injustice.

2) Androcentrism: It followed that the political culture of SOC envisioned the ideal-typical citizen as a majority ethnic male worker—a breadwinner and a family man. It was widely assumed, too, that this worker’s wage should be the principal, if not the sole, economic support of his family, while any wages earned by his wife should be merely supplemental. Known as the “family wage,” this gendered construct served both as a social ideal, connoting modernity and upward mobility, and as

the basis for state policy—in employment, welfare, and development. Granted, the ideal eluded most families, as a man's wage was rarely by itself sufficient to support children and a non-employed wife. And granted, too, the fordist industry to which the ideal was linked was soon to be dwarfed by a burgeoning low-wage service sector. But in the 1950s and 60s, the family-wage ideal still served to define gender norms and to discipline those who would contravene them, reinforcing men's authority in households and channeling aspirations into privatized domestic consumption. Equally important, by valorizing waged work, the political culture of SOC obscured the social importance of unwaged care work and reproductive labor. Institutionalizing androcentric understandings of family and work, it naturalized injustices of gender and removed them from political contestation.

3) *Étatism*: Then, too, SOC was *étatist*, suffused with a technocratic, managerial ethos. Relying on professional experts to design policies, and on bureaucratic organizations to implement them, welfare and developmental states treated those whom they ostensibly served more as clients, consumers, and tax-payers than as active citizens. The result was a depoliticized culture, which treated questions of justice as technical matters, to be settled by expert calculation or corporatist bargaining. Far from being empowered to interpret their needs dem-

ocratically, via political deliberation and contestation, ordinary citizens were positioned (at best) as passive recipients of satisfactions defined and dispensed from on high.

4) *Westphalianism*: Finally, SOC was, by definition, a national formation, aimed at mobilizing the capacities of national states to support national economic development in the name (if not always in the interest) of the national citizenry. Made possible by the Bretton Woods regulatory framework, this formation rested on a division of political space into territorially bounded polities. As a result, the political culture of SOC institutionalized the "Westphalian" view that binding obligations of justice apply only among fellow citizens. Subtending the lion's share of social struggle in the postwar era, this view channeled claims for justice into the domestic political arenas of territorial states. The effect, notwithstanding lip-service to international human rights and to anti-imperialist solidarity, was to truncate the scope of justice, marginalizing, if not wholly obscuring, cross-border injustices.

In general, then, the political culture of SOC was economistic, androcentric, *étatist*, and Westphalian—all characteristics that came under attack in the late 1960s and 1970s. In those years of explosive radicalism, SWFs joined their New Left and anti-imperialist counterparts in challenging the economism, the *étatism*, and (to a lesser degree) the Westphalianism of SOC, while also



contesting SOC's androcentrism—and with it, the sexism of their comrades and allies. Let us consider these points one by one.

1) SWF contra economism: Rejecting the exclusive identification of injustice with class maldistribution, SWFs joined other emancipatory movements to burst open the restrictive, economic imaginary of SOC. Politicizing “the personal,” they expanded the meaning of justice, reinterpreting as injustices social inequalities that had been overlooked, tolerated, or rationalized since time immemorial. Rejecting both Marxism's exclusive focus on political economy and liberalism's exclusive focus on law, they unveiled injustices located elsewhere—in the family and in cultural traditions, in civil society and in everyday life. In addition, SWFs expanded the number of axes that could harbor injustice. Rejecting the primacy of class, socialist-feminists, black-feminists, and anti-imperialist feminists also opposed radical-feminist efforts to install gender in that same position of categorial privilege. Focusing not only on gender, but also on class, race, sexuality, and nationality, they pioneered an “intersectionist” alternative that is widely accepted today. Finally, SWFs extended the purview of justice to take in such previously private matters as sexuality, housework, reproduction, and violence against women. In so doing, they effectively broadened the concept of injustice to encompass not only economic inequalities but also

hierarchies of status and asymmetries of political power. With the benefit of hindsight, we can say that they replaced a monistic economic view of justice with a broader three-dimensional understanding encompassing economy, culture and politics.

The result, moreover, was no mere laundry list of single issues. On the contrary, what connected the plethora of newly discovered injustices was the notion that women's subordination was systemic, grounded in the deep structures of society. SWFs argued, of course, about how best to characterize the social totality—whether as “patriarchy,” as a “dual-systems” amalgam of capitalism and patriarchy, as an imperialist world system, or, in my own preferred view, as an historically specific, androcentric form of state-organized capitalist society, structured by three interpenetrating orders of subordination: (mal)distribution, (mis)recognition, and (mis)representation. But despite such differences, most SWFs (with the notable exception of liberal-feminists) concurred that overcoming women's subordination required radical transformation of the deep structures of the social totality. This shared commitment to systemic transformation bespoke the movement's origins in the broader emancipatory ferment of the times.

2) SWF contra androcentrism: If SWF partook of that general aura of sixties radicalism, it nevertheless stood in a tense relation with other emanci-

patory movements. Its chief target, after all, was the gender injustice of SOC, hardly a priority for non-feminist anti-imperialists and New Leftists. In critiquing SOC's androcentrism, moreover, SWFs had also to confront sexism within the Left. For liberal and radical feminists, this posed no special problem; they could simply turn separatist and exit the Left. For socialist-feminists, anti-imperialist feminists, and feminists of color, in contrast, the difficulty was to confront sexism within the Left while remaining part of it.

For a time, at least, socialist-feminists succeeded in maintaining that difficult balance. They located the core of androcentrism in a gender division of labor that systematically devalued activities, both paid and unpaid, that were performed by or associated with women. Applying this analysis to SOC, they uncovered the deep-structural connections between women's responsibility for the lion's share of unpaid caregiving, their subordination in marriage and personal life, the gender segmentation of labor markets, men's domination of the political system, and the androcentrism of welfare provision, industrial policy, and development schemes. In effect, they exposed the family wage as the point where gender maldistribution, misrecognition, and misrepresentation converged. The result was a critique that integrated economy, culture and politics in a systematic account of women's subordination in SOC. Far from aiming simply to promote women's full incor-

poration as wage-earners in capitalist society, SWFs sought to transform the system's deep structures and animating values—in part by decentering wage work and valorizing unwaged activities, especially the socially necessary carework performed by women.

3) SWF contra étatism: But SWF's objections to SOC were as much concerned with process as with substance. Like their New Left allies, they rejected the bureaucratic-managerial ethos of SOC. To the widespread 60s critique of fordist organization, they added a gender analysis, interpreting the culture of large-scale, top-down institutions as expressing the modernized masculinity of the professional-managerial stratum of SOC. Developing a horizontal counter-ethos of sisterly connection, SWFs created the entirely new organizational practice of consciousness-raising. Seeking to bridge the sharp étatist divide between theory and practice, they styled themselves as a countercultural democratizing movement—anti-hierarchical, participatory, and demotic. In an era when the acronym "NGO" did not yet exist, feminists academics, lawyers, and social workers identified more with the grass roots than with the reigning professional ethos of depoliticized expertise.

But unlike some of their countercultural comrades, most feminists did not reject state institutions simpliciter. Seeking, rather, to infuse the latter with feminist values, they envisioned a participatory-democratic state that

empowered its citizens. Effectively re-imagining the relation between state and society, they sought to transform those positioned as passive objects of welfare and development policy into active subjects, empowered to participate in democratic processes of need interpretation. The goal, accordingly, was less to dismantle state institutions than to transform them into agencies that would promote, and indeed express, gender justice.

4) SWF contra-and-pro westphalianism: More ambivalent, perhaps was SWF's relation to the Westphalian dimension of SOC. Given its origins in the global anti-Vietnam War ferment of the time, the movement was clearly disposed to be sensitive to transborder injustices. This was especially the case for feminists in the developing world, whose gender critique was interwoven with a critique of imperialism. But there, as elsewhere, most feminists viewed their respective states as the principal addressees of their demands. Thus, SWFs tended to reinscribe the Westphalian frame at the level of practice, even when they criticized it at the level of theory. That frame, which divided the world into bounded territorial polities, remained the default option in an era when states still seemed to possess the requisite capacities for social steering and when the technology enabling real-time transnational networking was not yet available. In the context of SOC, then, the slogan "sisterhood is global" (itself already contested as imperializ-

ing) functioned more as an abstract gesture than as a postwestphalian political project that could be practically pursued.

Most research into the area of distance learning has been carried out with native-English speakers or monolingual speakers, and very few studies have examined the concerns of multilingual and multinational distance learners. Accordingly, this paper seeks to address the lack of research into this learner group by documenting the results of a research project undertaken with multilingual and multinational students (including myself) enrolled on a British university's Master in Education (MEd) distance learning programme administered in Hong Kong. The student cohort comprised Hong Kong Chinese students, Macanese students, native-Japanese speakers, native-German speakers, and native-English speakers from the United Kingdom and Australia.

The study was intended to assess the experiences of actual distance learners and to see if students' needs were being met by the programme. The results of the study will be presented and discussed in relation to the aims and philosophies that underpin distance education, the strengths and weaknesses of distance education, and the needs of distance learners as they relate to the key issues of course materials and learning support.

Before a fuller discussion of distance education can be undertaken, it is necessary first to clarify the



terms open learning and distance learning. In the field of non-traditional, post-school education, open learning and distance learning are terms which are often used interchangeably, and the literature abounds with overlapping terminology and conflicting viewpoints. Some propose that there is no distinction between the two (Rumble, 1989), and that "distance learning is a sub-category of open learning" (Lewis & Spencer, 1986, p. 17); others that "Open learning is not synonymous with distance education" (Foks, 1987, p. 74), a view echoed by Garrison (1990), who states that, "Open learning systems are not equivalent to...distance education" (p. 119).

It appears that there are significant differences between the two terms, although much modern usage blurs the distinction. Distance learning refers mainly to a mode of delivery (independent learning at a distance through the means of self-study texts and non-contiguous communication), while open learning includes the notions of both openness and flexibility (whereby students have personal autonomy over their studies and where access restrictions and privileges have been removed) and distance (as in independence from the teacher).

Keegan (1990, p. 44) identifies five main elements of distance education: the separation of teacher and learner; the influence of an educational organization; the use of technical media (usually print) to unite the teacher and learner and to carry educational con-

tent; the provision of two-way communication so that the student may benefit from or even initiate dialogue; and the possibility of occasional meetings for both didactic and socialization purposes. Keegan's formulation is a useful one (and one which appears to have been generally accepted by researchers, although one criticised by Garrison, 1990, as being too narrow), and is considered a suitable one for this paper since the distance learning programme under study included these five elements.

#### The Strengths and Weaknesses of Distance Education

Distance learning, like any kind of learning, can serve different ends, but distance learning appears mainly to serve those who cannot or do not want to make use of classroom teaching. Demanding professional commitments and family responsibilities of many adults often make attending a conventional, full-time, face-to-face course with fixed timetables a rather unrealistic proposition, and the reasons why adults choose distance education are primarily "the convenience, flexibility and adaptability of this mode of education to suit individual students' needs" (Holmberg, 1989, p. 24).

All learning requires a degree of motivation, self-discipline, and independence on behalf of the learner, but these aspects are arguably more pertinent in the case of distance learning, where the student is largely self-directed and unsupervised, and expected to be more autonomous.

Threlkeld and Brzoska (1994) state that "maturity, high motivation levels, and self-discipline have been shown to be necessary characteristics of successful, satisfied students" (p. 53). One of the main foci of this study is what factors contribute to this notion of "successful, satisfied students."

Distance study is self-study, but the student is not alone. As Holmberg (1989) describes it, "A kind of conversation in the form of two-way traffic occurs through the written or otherwise mediated interaction between the students and the tutors and others belonging to the supporting institution" (p. 27). Holmberg goes on to state that, "conversation is brought about by the presentation of the study matter if this is characterised by a personal approach and causes the students to discuss the contents with themselves" (p. 27). Such a development can be brought about by a readable style of presentation. The issue of course materials is directly relevant to the current study, and the dialogic approach to materials will be examined in more detail later in the paper.

Kirkup and Jones (1996) believe that the success of distance learning courses "cannot be assumed" (p. 277). Sharp cut-off dates for tutor-marked assignments, rigidity of learning content and materials, and inflexible learning structures are all common in distance education systems (Keegan, 1990), and are factors which clearly will not meet the needs of all learners. Kirkup and Jones (1996) summarise the most significant

weaknesses of distance education as (a) its inability to offer dialogue in the way that conventional face-to-face education does; (b) the inflexibility of its content and study method; and (c) the isolation and individualisation of the student.

#### Meeting the Needs of Distance Learners: Student Satisfaction

Garrison (1990) states that, "the majority of distance education is concerned with meeting the educational needs of adults" (p. 103), and Holmberg (1986) that "distance teaching will support student motivation, promote learning pleasure and effectiveness if offered in a way to make the study relevant to the individual learner and his/her needs" (p. 123).

Defining and categorising adult learners' needs is, though, a difficult task. Distance education offers students an opportunity to "study and learn in a peer-free environment, when and if they prefer it" (Verduin & Clark, 1991, p. 27), while also providing support during the learning experience in terms of guidance, planning, and feedback that is necessary for continued student motivation and completion of the course.

A review of the literature demonstrates that while there is no significant difference in achievement levels between distant and traditional learners, there is "considerable variance in student attitudes and satisfaction levels" (Johnstone, 1991, cited in Threlkeld & Brzoska, 1994, p. 49). Student satisfaction in distance education has been ex-

amined by a number of researchers (Beare, 1989; Hilgenberg & Tolone, 2000; Jones, 1992; McCleary & Egan, 1989). One of the most common problems of many distance learning courses is the limitation of dialogue between teachers and learners, and amongst learners themselves. As Kirkup and Jones (1996) state, "Students need dialogue with their teachers and with other students in order to consolidate and check on their own learning" (p. 278). Chen (1997) supports this view, finding student-instructor dialogue an important factor in distance learning. Furthermore, dialogue allows students to assess their learning and develop a sense of community with other students (a measure that can counter the effects of isolation often experienced by distance learners), and also allows the institution to assess its teaching objectives and see if they are being fulfilled.

Threlkeld and Brzoska (1994) maintain that there is little empirical evidence to show mediated instruction suffers in comparison to face-to-face instruction, stating that "the instructional medium doesn't appear to make any important difference in student achievement, attitudes and retention" (p. 42). They conclude that the media itself is not as important to instruction as other variables, such as learner characteristics, motivation, and instructional alternatives. It is these variables, they suggest, that are more pertinent to the process of learning and teaching at a distance, and thus to the

ability of distance education to meet the needs of learners.

The need for face-to-face meetings is undoubtedly important to the distance learner, although it is perhaps more a matter of the degree of interactivity than whether or not any interactivity takes place. As Stone (1990, cited in Threlkeld & Brzoska, 1994, p. 47) argues in his assessment of interactivity in distance learning, adult learners may actually perform better in situations where they control not only where but when learning occurs, and concludes that as long as students have some form of interaction with tutors, then high quality learning can still occur.

One way to counterbalance the absence of dialogue in distance learning is to institute sufficient student support services. Tait (1995) categorises student support as advice/counselling, tutoring (individually or in groups), the learning of study skills, peer group support, feedback concerning assessment and progress, language support and administrative problem-solving, where the aim is to support students' individual learning whether alone or in groups. Student support is a key issue in the provision of distance education, and three services appear repeatedly in the literature: timely student feedback, on-site support, and access to library materials. The response of tutors and "turn-around time" for comments and grading is cited again and again as being a critical component of student support, with students

who receive timely feedback on assignments responding more positively to the course than those who have to wait for feedback (Delbecq & Scates, 1989). The support provided by on-site facilitators has also been consistently cited as crucial to the effectiveness of a distance education programme (McCleary & Egan, 1989; Murphy & Yum, 1998; Threlkeld, 1992; Threlkeld & Brzoska, 1994). Burge and Howard (1990), too, in their questionnaire study of audio-conferencing in Canadian graduate education, found that the effective utilisation of local tutors (or on-site facilitators) increases student satisfaction with courses.

Finally, access to library materials is a key component of distance education. For many learners, access to library resources may well be limited. This creates obvious problems for the distance learner. An evaluation of learner support conducted by Dillon, Gunawardena, and Parker (1992; cited in Threlkeld & Brzoska, 1994, p. 57) noted that "Library resources are very

important to distance students as the majority of them indicated that success in the course required access to library materials." The issue of student support has received renewed interest recently, with Tait (2000) and Simpson (2000) both exploring this aspect of distance learning in some detail.

In considering student support services, any institution that offers courses through distance learning must address the question of who their learners are and what their needs are. The institution must then determine how those needs can be met with regard to constraints of costs, technologies, and geography. It appears that media such as correspondence, face-to-face, telephone, and electronic communications provide a variety of means which differ widely in their effectiveness. Clearly, then, the course materials and the tutors are of significant import in distance education, and resources that contribute greatly to meeting the needs of learners.

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